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1. Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a surge in the economic research of bank-
ruptcy. Thanks to this research, many things have become much clearer but
there is still a large area of disagreement about how an optimal bankruptcy
law should look. At the same time, the actual bankruptcy laws in various
countries differ substantially in many respects. These differences reflect
the underlying differences of the economic and institutional conditions,
the path-dependency of economic and institutional development, and, last
but not least, the political-economy factors. Although we may hope that fu-
ture research will help us design better bankruptcy laws, there will never
be something such as a generally applicable best solution.
In the present paper we want to set the stage for the debate about
bankruptcy in the Czech Republic. Our major goal in the paper is to high-
light considerations that are often overlooked – not only in the policy de-
bate about the design of a bankruptcy law but also in the academic research
concerning this issue. We start with a brief explanation in Section 2 of why
a bankruptcy law is needed at all.
In section 3, we deal with the dichotomy of ex-ante vs. ex-post effects of
bankruptcy laws. The debate often deals only with the effects of different
concepts on firms already in bankruptcy. While these firms represent only
a small fraction of the economy, the bankruptcy law affects the behavior of
all the debtors and creditors. In other words, the bankruptcy law not only
has ex-post effects (effects on firms in bankruptcy) but also ex-ante effects
(effects on the actions of sound firms and creditors).
In section 4, we analyze the influence of institutional factors on the opti-
mal design of a bankruptcy law. As Hart (2000) notes with respect to
bankruptcy laws: “[...] it is unlikely that ‘one size fits all’. That is, although
some bankruptcy procedures can probably be rejected as being manifestly
bad, there is a class of procedures that satisfy the main criteria of efficiency.
Which procedure a country chooses or should choose may then depend on
other factors, e.g., the country’s institutional structure and legal tradition.”
(Hart, 2000, p. 1)
Of particular importance for the optimal bankruptcy law design is
the quality of the judiciary. Judges make crucial decisions in the course of
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many decisions during the proceedings, to approving the final distribution
or thereorganization plan. Their capacity and moral standards affect theop-
timal level of discretion given to them.
Before we start with the agenda outlined above, a disclaimer needs to be
made: we do not claim the right to determine what should be the goal of
the bankruptcy law, in particular, whether it should be to achieve maxi-
mum efficiency without distributional concerns or whether pure efficiency
should cede to some distributional goals. This question should be answered
by the politicians. Our ambition, instead, is to discuss the consistency of
various designs with different possible goals of bankruptcy laws. It should
also be stressed that although the issues discussed here are relevant for
the current debate about the Czech bankruptcy reform, we do not expli-
citly deal with the analysis and solution of particular problems.
2. The Need for Bankruptcy Law
The first question is: Do we really need a bankruptcy law? And if yes, why
do we need it? Bankruptcy laws represent a state intervention in the con-
tracting freedom as they restrict the set of ex-ante feasible contracts. Once
bankruptcy is declared, debt contracts are, in fact, invalidated and replaced
by the rules contained in the bankruptcy code. In a standard Arrow-Debreu
economy without externalities and other market failures, such restrictions
would be harmful to overall social welfare. Therefore, the economic justifi-
cation for bankruptcy law, if any, must consist in the presence of market
failures.
Standard justification says that bankruptcy law is needed to resolve a si-
tuation where the creditors’claims are mutually inconsistent, i.e., there are
more creditors and there are not enough assets to compensate all of them
according to their contracts. Without the automatic stay on individual debt
collection in bankruptcy, creditors would be motivated to “run on assets” in
order to be the first to collect. The Nash equilibrium resulting from their
optimal individual strategies would not be socially optimal. This particular
market failure represents theusual explanation of theneed for abankruptcy
law.
Given that agents are rational, we should ask why firms have more cre-
ditors at all? The inefficiency would not arise if each firm had a single cre-
ditor. The answer to the question of creditor multiplicity can be found in
several papers on financial contracting. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and
Berglof et al. (2003), for example, develop models in which the creditor mul-
tiplicity is not a result of chance but is determined endogenously. In
the model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the increased costs incurred ex-
post in the presence of multiple creditors reduce the incentives of the debtor
to default strategically. Berglof et al. (2003) find the major effects of multi-
ple creditors to be higher debt capacity because the debtor can credibly com-
mit to higher repayments. Unlike in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the in-
centives to default strategically in their model increase with the presence
of multiple creditors, which is due to higher debt. In both models, however,
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to find an optimal trade-off between the two.1
The hypotheses of these models should be verified empirically before
adopting them as valid. Although the multiplicity of creditors arises en-
dogenously from the assumptions of the models and not as a matter of
chance, the validity of the assumptions might possibly be questioned. In
particular, the ex-post inefficiency in the models arises mainly due to fric-
tion in ex-post bargaining after default which prevents the debtor and
the creditors from achieving the socially efficient solution. In reality, this
need not be the case – e.g., when the number of parties bargaining is as
small as three. Another questionable assumption is that the continuation
under the original management is always optimal. In fact, it may often be
optimal to fire theoriginal management and hire anew one. Changing these
assumptions would change the outcome of the models considerably.
Given that the assumptions of the above-mentioned models are valid,
the multiplicity of creditors is a natural result of the agents’ rational be-
havior. The question that follows is why the mechanism for the resolution
of the debtor’s default, under the presence of multiple creditors, cannot be
stipulated in a contract. Here, the usual answer is that all contracts are
necessarily incomplete – they do not specify optimal actions for all the states
of the world, simply because it is not possible to foresee ex-ante all the states
that can occur, to describe them in a contract, and to specify optimal actions
for all these states. Even if theindividual contingencies that may arise (cash
flows, effort level, investment levels) may be observable for the parties of
the contract, they may not be verifiable by an outside party, e.g., the court,
and the contract cannot be made contingent upon them. Therefore, the ac-
tual contracts are either not state-dependent at all or they only specify ac-
tions for a small subset of possible states.2
The above argument shows that some mechanism to resolve the incon-
sistency of individual creditors’claims in case of bankruptcy is needed. Our
final note, to be taken as a topic for discussion rather than as a recom-
mendation, concerns the question whether this has to be a state-provided
bankruptcy law. Hart (2000), for example, proposes that companies be al-
lowed to opt out from the state bankruptcy procedure. If they can agree with
their creditors, there seems to be no reason why they should be prevented
from selecting their preferred procedure. The only problem one can think
of in connection with this possibility is the protection of certain creditors,
in particular those who have not become creditors from their own will, such
as tort claimants or tax authority, and those who are in a weaker position
with respect to the company, such as the workers. These classes of credi-
tors could be protected by requiring that they could not receive worse treat-
ment than under the default bankruptcy regime, represented by state
bankruptcy law.
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ness chambers which operate dispute resolution panels would start to pro-
vide their own insolvency proceedings and the competition among them
would keep down the costs and push up the speed and quality of services
provided. The bottom-line is that although the incomplete contracts argu-
ment may justify the existence of a bankruptcy procedure, it need not jus-
tify the exclusivity of state-provided bankruptcy regimes.
It is clear from the argument above that bankruptcy laws necessarily in-
terfere with the individual rights of creditors. However, we can observe dif-
ferent degrees of this interference with creditors’ rights in different
bankruptcy law designs around the world. In general, we can distinguish
between bankruptcy systems that are tough on debtors (i.e., assigning
strong control rights to creditors) and those that are soft (i.e., limiting cre-
ditors’rights substantially). Existing bankruptcy laws range from extremely
tough to extremely soft. In this paper, we discuss what factors determi-
ne whether the optimal bankruptcy law should be rather soft or rather
tough.
Before turning to this, however, we provide an explanation of what we
understand under a soft and a tough bankruptcy law. A law is soft if it in-
cludes a regime under which the debtor can remain in control following
bankruptcy even if the creditors would not agree with this. The aim of keep-
ing the debtor in control is to give him a chance to reorganize the company
and to keep it as a going concern. Whether the debtor gets this chance is
decided by the court. The debtor then prepares a reorganization plan, speci-
fying changes both in the cash-flow rights, control rights and in the ope-
rations of the firm. In principle, this plan has to be approved by the cre-
ditors but, under certain conditions, the consent of both individual credi-
tors and the whole classes of creditors is not necessary.
On the other hand, the law is tough if the creditors have major influence
over the bankruptcy proceedings. Even a tough bankruptcy law may con-
tain a reorganization chapter but the creditors are entitled to decide whe-
ther the debtor shall be allowed to enter into reorganization. Here, the prin-
ciple that the creditors are in fact the economic owners of the bankrupt firm
and should thus be allowed to make the most important decisions is applied
consistently.
Usually, the U.S. bankruptcy code is considered to be soft on creditors be-
cause its Chapter 11 endorses the principles associated above with the soft
bankruptcy law. The German or British bankruptcy codes can be consi-
dered tough, according to the above criteria. An interesting experience of
the Czech Republic shows that even a “nominally” tough bankruptcy law
can turn out to be soft in its effects if the debtors can maintain control by
taking advantage of various flaws in the law or, sometimes, via outright
corruption of the bankruptcy judges.
3. Ex-ante and Ex-post Efficiency
An important consideration in connection with the assessment of
a bankruptcy law quality is one distinguishing between its ex-ante and ex-
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ter, looking at what happens after bankruptcy is declared.3 The institution
of bankruptcy, however, does not purely affect a certain segment of firms in
theeconomy that go bankrupt (ex-post effect). Theindirect effects on therest
of the economy take place through the possibility of bankruptcy in the fu-
ture (ex-ante effect).
The ex-post efficiency criterion requires that a socially optimal solution
be implemented after bankruptcy occurs. For several reasons, giving con-
trol to creditors may not guarantee that such a solution will be achieved.
For example, social optimality may require leaving the debtor (debtor’s ma-
nagement) in control because they most likely have better information than
anybody else, including the creditors, about what to do with the firm.4 This
may also require canceling most of the debt in order to provide the debtor
with the right incentives. Another reason for ex-post inefficiency of giving
full control to creditors is that the socially optimal solution may be diffe-
rent from the solution that would maximize the market value of the firm,
i.e., value available for creditors. This situation arises in the presence of ex-
ternalities created by the firm, which the creditors would not internalize.
Thus, they could liquidate the firm, although it would be socially optimal
to reorganize it and continue operation.5 These two examples, however, re-
present just one side of the coin – ex-post efficiency.
To also account for ex-ante efficiency, one has to consider how debtors and
creditors adjust their behavior in the pre-bankruptcy stage conditional to
what happens in bankruptcy. How the set-up designed to achieve an opti-
mal solution ex-post will affect the ex-ante effort of the debtor to avoid
bankruptcy and the willingness of creditors to borrow? If there are sub-
stantial distortions, then theexclusive focus on ex-post optimality may cause
significant harm to overall optimality. For example, even if asoft bankruptcy
law is ex-post optimal, some projects with positive net present value may
not be financed because the creditors may not be able to extract sufficient
value from the debtor to at least compensate their initial outlay.
Asoft bankruptcy law will also affect creditors’actions once they financed
the project. The risk of bankruptcy, in which they may suffer substantial
losses, induces them to negotiate such contractual terms with the debtor
that allows them to liquidate endangered projects as soon as the first signs
of potential problems appear, even though this may also be connected with
losses. Therefore, some viable projects may be liquidated prematurely. Soft
bankruptcy laws also affect the actions of the debtor or its management.
Knowing that they can keep control in bankruptcy, the debtor will be less
motivated to avoid it. This further aggravates the moral hazard problem
connected with debt financing because thedebtor will be motivated to choose
more risky strategies.
On the other hand, an ex-post efficient soft bankruptcy law has some po-
sitive ex-ante effects, too. It provides creditors with stronger incentives to
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ing, stronger monitoring creates positive externalities for other stake-hold-
ers who benefit from the due management of the firm (e.g., shareholders,
workers or the tax-authority). If bankruptcy becomes very likely or even in-
evitable and the law is tough on the debtor, the same factors that served to
discipline the management in a sound firm may now play a different, un-
desirable role. Because tough laws give control and cash flow rights in
bankruptcy to creditors, the distressed firms have little to loose and their
management is motivated to choose “all or nothing” strategies that have
very high probability of failure but in case of success can keep the firm alive.
The debtor may even try to divert assets and cash flow from the distressed
firm to other projects.
We, however, believe that the negative ex-ante effects of a soft bankruptcy
law prevail over the positive effects. First, the net effect of stronger moni-
toring by the creditors may be reduced because shareholders may decrease
their monitoring efforts and rely more on monitoring by the creditors. Se-
cond, the aggravated moral hazard problem under a tough bankruptcy law
can partly be mitigated by including sanctions to the management for ac-
tions reducing or endangering the value of the firm. In addition, this ag-
gravated moral hazard problem concerns only a small amount of busi-
nesses which become distressed, while the positive effect of a tough
bankruptcy law on effort in sound firms concerns all the firms in the eco-
nomy.
The bottom-line of the above discussion is that there is a trade-off between
ex-ante and ex-post efficiency. Although a soft bankruptcy law may lead to
better results ex-post, it has negative effects ex-ante. Where on the scale
between absolutely soft and absolutely tough should the law optimally be,
depends on various factors, which we discuss below.
3.1 Macroeconomic Conditions
In calm economic periods, bankruptcy is rather a rare event and, more
importantly, firms that go bankrupt are usually those that are economically,
not only financially distressed. The distinction between economic and fi-
nancial distress is crucial. It relies on the causes of the firm’s inability to
repay its debt. Economic distress means that the firm does not use its in-
puts optimally and it would be socially efficient if these resources were freed
from this inefficient use and put into another use. In this case, both the so-
cially optimal solution and the solution maximizing the value for creditors
may consist in auctioning off the firm’s assets. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the going concern value, if any, would have to be lost because
the firm may be sold as a going concern. Of course, all sorts of the well-
-known problems arise in the auction, including asymmetric information, li-
quidity constraints or incomplete contracts, preventing the first best result
to be achieved in all situations. However, the question is whether we have
a better alternative than to reconcile with the second best.
Financial but not economic distress, on the other hand, is not caused by
shortcomings in the firm’s operations but usually by some shock to its ca-
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those in Asia at the end of the 1990s, economically sound firms become in-
solvent if their debt is denominated in foreign currency and the local cur-
rency depreciates substantially. Liquidating the firm in this situation would
not be socially optimal. In this case, a hard law can cause social losses in
the form of excessive liquidations. On the other hand, soft law, which pro-
vides a protection to the debtor before the creditors, can help the affected
firms survive the turbulent times and, in the end, can even lead to higher
payoffs to the creditors.
For such situations of systemic distress, Stiglitz (2000) suggests a Super
Chapter 11, a special chapter in a country’s bankruptcy code, which would
stay dormant in calm times and would only be activated in the periods of
macroeconomic turbulences. Like the valid U.S. Chapter  11, the main cha-
racteristic of the proposed law would be that the debtor would stay in con-
trol during reorganization and the capital structure would be adjusted, usu-
ally by means of a debt-equity swap. According to Stiglitz (2000), the Super
Chapter 11 would have to meet the following requirements to effectively ad-
dress the systemic distress:
1. to set strict time-limits for courts to rule and sanctions for those at-
tempting to delay,
2. to be soft on incumbent management and old shareholders, giving them
sufficient equity stake in the reorganized firm in order to provide them
with adequate incentives, and
3. to determine a wide set of default provisions or guideline provisions in
order to facilitate the resolution.
Although this is an interesting proposal, its potential consequences would
have to be carefully investigated before its introduction. There are a num-
ber of issues connected with this proposal. Who should decide the activa-
tion of the Super Chapter 11? What would be the criteria for the activation?
Would there be some maximal term after which it would automatically be
de-activated? These are only a few of the many issues that would have to
be considered.
3.2 Credit-Rationing vs. Excessive Liquidations
Biais and Mariotti (2003) consider different factors that affect whether
rather soft or tough bankruptcy laws will be optimal. They build a general
equilibrium model and study interactions between the credit and labor mar-
kets. The agents in their model are heterogeneous and differ by their ini-
tial level of wealth. The desirability of a tough law may follow from the ne-
gative effect of a soft law on the access to credit. A soft law may lead to
credit rationing because the creditors, due to concerns of what happens in
the case of bankruptcy, will not be willing to lend enough to finance all
the projects with positive net present value. Some of the projects of rela-
tively poor agents will not be realized even if their NPV is higher than that
of the projects of wealthy agents who can co-finance a higher fraction of
the project costs.
Due to credit-rationing, the aggregate level of investments is lower, which
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cause some agents who would prefer to become entrepreneurs have to be-
come workers (they do not have access to credit). The lower demand for and
higher supply of labor lead to lower wages, which hurts also the poorest
agents who could not become entrepreneurs even under tough law. There-
fore, in this way, the soft law is harmful especially for middle-class and poor
agents. Rich agents need relatively little debt financing, which they can
raise even under soft law. They benefit from the possibility, provided by
the soft law, to avoid liquidation in the case of default.
An overly tough law, however, need not be optimal either because it gives
rise to a negative externality generated by the interactions of the credit and
labor markets in the presence of moral hazard. To understand this, note
that an important role of debt is the one of a disciplining device. Giving
a creditor the right to liquidate assets following default induces the debtor
not to default strategically in the good states of the world when he has suf-
ficient funds to repay the debt. In the bad states of the world, the threat of
liquidation is realized because the firm is cash-constrained and cannot re-
pay its creditors. The fact that a firm is cash-constrained, however, need
not mean that the liquidation is optimal and further operation of the firm
by the original owner may be socially efficient. Creditors are assumed to ig-
nore this negative externality of liquidation.
Now, assume that a tough law enables all agents who wish to start a firm
to do so – there is no credit-rationing and all agents who wanted to become
entrepreneurs actually became entrepreneurs. This, however, comes at
a price. In order to obtain financing they have to issue risky debt and com-
mit to liquidations in case of default. Due to the absence of credit-rationing,
themarginal entrepreneur is indifferent between becoming anentrepreneur
or a worker. The marginal entrepreneur, by deciding to become an en-
trepreneur, increases the overall demand for labor and thus wages. There
is a negative externality for the other entrepreneurs generated by this de-
cision. Their pledgeable income decreases and they have to commit to higher
asset liquidations in case of default. This increases the frequency of ineffi-
cient liquidations and thus reduces social welfare. The soft law, by intro-
ducing some credit rationing, would improve social welfare because this
negative externality would be partly eliminated.
The point that Biais and Mariotti (2003) make is that some credit ra-
tioning may be desirable because it reduces the amount of inefficient li-
quidations. On the other hand, because credit rationing also leads to lower
investments and lower wages, too much is harmful. The optimal law, there-
fore, should optimally trade-off these two effects. A crucial assumption of
the whole analysis in Biais and Mariotti (2003) is that continuation is effi-
cient while liquidation is not. The results would change if we, instead, as-
sumed that liquidation can sometimes be efficient or that the loss result-
ing from separating the assets from the original owner is not very high.6 In
other words, the question is what percentage of firms ends up in bankruptcy
due to financial distress, when continuation under the original owner may
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a tough law is stronger, the higher the percentage of bankruptcies due to
economic distress.
4. Institutions Matter – Also in Bankruptcy
The distinction in the previous section of bankruptcy laws on tough and
soft is quite crude and a decision into which category the law should fall
does not entirely solve the problem of optimal bankruptcy law design. In
fact, the problem is much more complex and consists in deciding how all
thedifferent issues arising in bankruptcy should optimally be resolved. Usu-
ally, the problem is who (which body) should have the power to make a par-
ticular decision, what is the level of discretion when making this decision,
and, in some cases, what procedural rules have to be observed in the pro-
cess leading to the decision. From these complex set of issues we focus on
the division of decision-making powers between the court and the creditors.
In some situations, for example in the declaration of bankruptcy, the in-
volvement of the courts is inevitable. But in most of the remaining situa-
tions, it is not so clear – take, for example, the appointment of a bankruptcy
trustee. Giving the power to creditors, although, as a whole, they are usu-
ally the residual owners, need not always be optimal, as they form a hete-
rogeneous group and the interests of the winning coalition may not be
the same as those of a benevolent social planner. The judge is often viewed
as such a benevolent agent but he not always fulfils this role. One reason
is that he may lack the professional capacity needed to make a qualified de-
cision in often very complex commercial issues. The other reason is that in
some cases, judges may be corrupt and act in the interest of some particu-
lar individual or group involved in the bankruptcy.
4.1 Capacity to Make Commercial Decisions
Under some bankruptcy regimes, judges make crucial decisions regard-
ing the operation of the bankrupt firm. The question is whether they are
fit to make such decisions. The other alternative usually is to give the de-
cision powers to the creditors, i.e., to the de-facto owners of the bankrupt
firm’s assets, who generally have the right incentives to adopt the best so-
lution. Nor the creditors, however, are always able to achieve the best, e.g.,
because of conflicts between secured and unsecured creditors. Under soft
laws, like the U.S. bankruptcy code, the discretion entrusted to judges is
usually wider. Because of the supreme quality of the American judiciary,
compared, e.g., to the Czech one, the problems arising in the U.S. would
most likely be even greater in the Czech Republic.
American judges decide whether the debtor shall be reorganized or liqui-
dated (shut down). This question is virtually decided when the judge allows
or disallows the debtor to use the firm’s available funds to finance further
operation. Uninterrupted operation may be necessary to save the going con-
cern value, if any, because if the firm is closed down temporarily, it can loose
most of its customers and, thus, not allowing for further operation usually
means shut-down. On the other hand, if it is better to shut the firm down
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available to creditors. The available evidence about the performance of
American judges in making the reorganization vs. shut-down decision is
mixed. Here, we mention two papers with opposite conclusions about this
issue.
Morrison (2003) focuses on small and medium firms where the decision
is likely to be easier than in the case of large corporations. He finds that
the majority of firms in his sample that enter reorganization are eventu-
ally not reorganized in the economic sense but are either sold to an outside
buyer or liquidated. Even if the firm enters reorganization, judges often de-
cide to shut it down. This presents counter-evidence to the view held by
some scholars that the Chapter 11 practices harm the creditors because
even virtually dead firms can use Chapter 11 to postpone their shut-down
until there are no funds left to finance further operation. In addition, Mor-
rison (2003) finds that most of theshut-down decisions occur early in thepro-
cess, immediately after the judge learns about the chances of the reorgani-
zation to succeed, and, therefore, the loss to the creditors from inefficient
continuation is not extremely high.
These conclusions, however, need not be fully representative for two rea-
sons. First, the sample includes only small and medium firms. These firms
form the majority of bankruptcy cases but in terms of value, the bankrupt-
cies of large corporations are more important. The typical bankruptcy de-
cision making in large corporations, as shown further, may differ from that
in small and medium firms. Second, Morrison focuses on the bankruptcy
practices of a single court which, as he himself notes, has a very well de-
veloped procedural rules for the bankruptcy agenda, forcing the judges to
make decisions promptly.
Weiss and Wruck (1997) present an opposite view on the judicial perfor-
mance in bankruptcy decision making. They study the bankruptcy of East-
ern Airlines, which remained in Chapter 11 for 22 months and lost half of
its value during this period – the value declined from 4 to 2 billion dollars.
They show that the major cause of the loss of value was not the deteriora-
tion in the industry conditions but the “information problems and conflicts
of interest associated with the Chapter 11 process” (p. 56). They describe
what happened in the Eastern Airlines as court-approved asset stripping
because the court allowed the managers to use the proceeds from asset sales
to keep flying, even after it became clear that the firm was not economi-
cally viable. Were the creditors given the chance to make the decision, they
would close the firm down at a much earlier stage. Here, the over-protec-
tive law was used to shield the firm from economic reality and resulted in
substantial inefficiency.
4.2 Judicial Corruption
Until recently, virtually all researchers in the field of economics of
bankruptcy considered the debtor and the creditors (of different types and
classes) as the only players of the bankruptcy game, implicitly assuming
that the judge is either just an enforcing mechanism or a benevolent agent
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discussed, the arguments stemmed from the ability of judges to find opti-
mal solutions for several issues they decide on, leaving aside their motiva-
tion.
It is an important characteristic of the soft law that it provides the judge
with high discretionary powers. If the soft law is to have positive effects, it
is important that the judge is benevolent – acts to maximize social welfare.
If the judge is corrupt, the discretion given to them may be abused to sa-
tisfy particular interests. This reduces both ex-ante and ex-post efficiency.
Theex-ante efficiency is reduced because of uncertainty how thejudge would
decide if the bankruptcy were declared, which prevents the parties to ad-
just ex-ante their relationship to the possibility of bankruptcy. Ex-post ef-
ficiency is reduced because the solution adopted does not necessarily aim
to maximize social welfare. Two different treatments of the effects of cor-
ruption in the bankruptcy procedure are Biais and Recasens (2002) and
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003).
Biais and Recasens (2002) study the trade-off between soft law (debtor
oriented) and tough law (creditor oriented) bankruptcy regimes. The au-
thors develop a model based on a simple corporate finance model by Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997). Within the model, under a tough law any insolvent
firm is liquidated, while under a soft law a judge decides whether an in-
solvent firm be liquidated (with the liquidation value going to creditors) or
reorganized (with the reorganization payoff going to managers in the form
of a nontransferable cash flow). The authors emphasize that excessive li-
quidation is socially costly in the sense of non-utilization of firm-specific
capital and breaking functioning networks. This social cost argument would
favor a soft law. However, giving the decision power to a judge that should
take into account observed social costs, reduces creditors’ expected payoff
and, thus, implies credit rationing.
However, themain contribution of theauthors is their inclusion of thepos-
sibility of corruption among judges in this model. Aclear result of the model
is that once judges are corrupt, tough law is socially preferred to soft law
because the soft law’s advantage of the efficient scope of liquidation is gone.
In other words, in the presence of high judicial corruption, the soft law ge-
nerates more credit rationing.
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003) discuss the effect of the capture of ju-
diciary on the behavior of agents under U.S.-like bankruptcy law design.
They were inspired by the observation of the Russian bankruptcy proce-
dures after a new law of 1998 implemented Chapter-11-like reorganization.
The authors show in their model that when the judiciary is captured,
the manager has no incentives to restructure and the debt to the outside
investor is not repaid. Instead the threat of bankruptcy perpetuates a col-
lusive deal between the manager and the regional governor who can influ-
ence the judge. The theoretical analysis is accompanied with an empirical
verification on the data of Russian firms, which confirms the results. Thus,
while using a different setup than Biais and Recasens (2000), Lambert-
-Mogiliansky (2003) reach the same recommendation for countries with
a high degree of judicial corruption – to adopt a tough bankruptcy law that
assigns minimum discretion to the judge. This result is very simple and
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nected with bankruptcy promises to improve our understanding of thetrade-
-offs between soft and tough laws under different country-specific circum-
stances.
5. Conclusion
In the beginning we emphasized that when designing a bankruptcy law,
it is important to decide what goals the law shall achieve. Shall the goal be
to maximize the economic performance by shutting down inefficient firms
and freeing their resources for a more efficient uses? Or is maintaining em-
ployment in the short run also important? Or are other goals relevant?
A benevolent social planner would choose a law whose only goal is to ma-
ximize overall, long-term benefits. Such a law would promote stable and
high economic growth and high level of employment in the long run. In
the short run, however, it could cause some painful situations connected
with the failure of large firms employing many people. Because political
economy factors are important in reality, the bankruptcy laws usually dif-
fer from those that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner.
The politicians operate in a short time horizon and goals of long-term effi-
ciency are often out of their sight.
The Czech Republic is no exception in this sense. All the competing ver-
sions of the prepared bankruptcy reform are rather soft laws, with the em-
phasis on maintaining employment. Although we do not want to make a ge-
neral judgement that tough law is better for the long-run efficiency (such
a judgement would not be justified given the current state of research in
this topic), the conditions prevailing in the Czech Republic speak rather in
favor of a tough law. The heavy dependence of the Czech economy on debt
rather than equity financing makes the problem of credit rationing stem-
ming from ex-ante inefficiency more severe. Maybe even more strikingly,
the state of the Czech judiciary gives rise to doubts of how the judges will
use the discretion awarded to them by the proposed law.
Definitely, more research – both theoretical and empirical – is needed, so
that we are able to make clear conclusions. While in international litera-
ture the research in this field has grown rapidly during the last decade,
the Czech Republic is still waiting for serious research in bankruptcy to
come.
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What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design?
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In this paper we discuss the factors that interact in the design of an optimal
bankruptcy law. We focus on issues that are often overlooked in both the policy de-
bate and in the academic research on bankruptcy. We first deal with the question
why abankruptcy law is needed at all. Theanswer that we provide concerns themul-
tiplicity of creditors in connection with contract incompleteness. We then introduce
a concept of ex ante vs. ex post efficiency. What this concept demonstrates is that,
when designing a bankruptcy regime, one cannot limit attention to the firms that
actually find themselves in bankruptcy proceedings; instead, one needs to consider
the effects of the bankruptcy law on the behavior of all the debtors and creditors in
the economy and on the resulting price and availability of credit. The second factor
we deal with is institutional quality, namely the quality of the judiciary. Proponents
of a strong judicial role in bankruptcy often cite the judiciary’s role in rendering
complicated commercial decisions. We claim instead that, considering factors such
as imprudence and corruption, it may be optimal to resign on the first-best solution
that could be theoretically achievable with a benevolent and omniscient judiciary.
The optimal bankruptcy law would then contain more simple and automatic rules
and less space for judicial (i.e., individual) discretion. Our concluding comment con-
cerns the lack of empirical research in the bankruptcy area in the Czech Republic
and the essential need for such research.
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